

Lecture #2

The Human Element Social Engineering and User-Centric Security

Why the User is Your Biggest Vulnerability and Greatest Strength

Today's Agenda

- **Part 1: The Psychology of Deception** - Why social engineering works.
- **Part 2: The Mobile Attack Surface** - Common attack vectors.
- **Part 3: User Behavior & Risky Habits** - A look in the mirror.
- **Part 4: Taking Control with Code** - Managing permissions on iOS & Android.
- **Part 5: Proactive Defense** - Building a "human firewall."
- **Part 6: Secure Coding for Trust** - Biometrics and secure storage.

Part 1: The Psychology of Deception

- **The "Weakest Link"**

Recap from Lecture 1

- **Technical Threats**
 - Malware (Pegasus)
 - OS Vulnerabilities (Stagefright)
 - Network Attacks (Man-in-the-Middle)

Today's Threat: A Simple Phone Call



The Scenario, Part 1

- **Vishing (Voice Phishing)**
- **Attacker:** "Hello, this is Alex from the fraud department at Bank of America. We've detected a suspicious login attempt from a new device in a different country."

The Scenario, Part 2

- **User:** "Oh, really? That wasn't me."
- **Attacker:** "I didn't think so. To protect your account, I need to freeze it immediately. But first, I must verify I'm speaking to the account owner. I've just sent a verification code to your phone. Can you please read it back to me?"

The Attack

- **The "verification code" is actually a password reset code.**
- If you read them the code, they can:
 - 1. Reset your password.
 - 2. Lock you out of your own account.
 - 3. Gain complete control.

What Was Exploited?

- Not a software bug.
- Not a hardware flaw.
- **Human trust and our instinct to react to urgency were exploited.**


The Psychology of Social Engineering (Chapter 3)

- **Why We Fall For It**
- Attackers exploit fundamental human tendencies.


Principle 1: Authority

- We are conditioned to comply with people we perceive as being in charge.
 - A "bank manager"
 - A "police officer"
 - An "IT administrator"
 - A "fraud investigator"

Authority: Mobile Example




Principle 2: Urgency



Principle 3: Likability / Deception

- Attackers can be friendly and build rapport to gain our trust. They might pretend to be:
 - A colleague from another department.
 - A new employee who needs help.
 - A friend whose phone broke.


Likability: Mobile Example



Principle 4: Scarcity

- Creating the illusion of a limited-time opportunity.
 - "Only 3 left in stock!"
 - "This discount is for the first 100 callers only!"
 - "You've won a prize! Claim it now!"

Scarcity: Mobile Example



Part 2: The Mobile Attack Surface

- **Common Social Engineering Vectors**


Vector 1: Smishing (SMS Phishing)

- The classic fake text with a malicious link.



Vector 2: Vishing (Voice Phishing)

- The phone call we discussed. Often uses **Caller ID Spoofing** to appear as if it's coming from a legitimate source like your bank or the police.



Vector 3: Quishing (QR Code Phishing)


- Replacing legitimate QR codes with malicious ones.
 - On a parking meter.
 - On a restaurant menu.
 - In a promotional flyer.

Quishing Example



Vector 4: App-Based Manipulation

- A malicious app using fake notifications or UI elements to trick you.




Part 3: User Behavior & Risky Habits

- **A Look in the Mirror**

Risky Habit 1: "Permission Fatigue"

- Granting all requested permissions to an app without thinking.



Risky Habit 2: Weak Authentication

- Using simple, easy-to-guess passcodes ("1234", "0000").
- No passcode at all.
- A pattern lock that is easily smudged on the screen.



Risky Habit 3: Reusing Passwords

- Using the same password for your email, banking, and social media apps.



Risky Habit 4: Connecting to Open Wi-Fi

- Using "Free_Cafe_WiFi" without a VPN.



Risky Habit 5: Ignoring Updates

- Delaying OS and app updates.



Part 4: Taking Control with Code

- **Managing Permissions on iOS & Android**

The Principle of Least Privilege

- An app should only have access to the data and resources it **absolutely needs** to function.
 - A calculator app does **not** need your location.
 - A photo editing app does **not** need your contacts.

Android Permissions: The Manifest

- You must declare all required permissions in `AndroidManifest.xml`

```
<!-- AndroidManifest.xml -->
<manifest ...>
    <!-- Required for network access -->
    <uses-permission android:name="android.permission.INTERNET" />

    <!-- Required for accessing the camera -->
    <uses-permission android:name="android.permission.CAMERA" />

    <!-- Required for fine location -->
    <uses-permission android:name="android.permission.ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION" />

    <application ...>
        </application>
    </manifest>
```

Android Permissions: Requesting at Runtime

- For dangerous permissions (like Camera or Location), you must request them from the user while the app is running.

```
// In your Activity or Fragment
val requestPermissionLauncher =
    registerForActivityResult(ActivityResultContracts.RequestPermission()) { isGranted: Boolean ->
        if (isGranted) {
            // Permission is granted. Continue the action or workflow in your app.
            Log.d("Permission", "Camera permission granted")
        } else {
            // Explain to the user that the feature is unavailable because the
            // features requires a permission that the user has denied.
            Log.d("Permission", "Camera permission denied")
        }
    }

// ...


// When you need to use the camera
when {
    ContextCompat.checkSelfPermission(
        this,
        Manifest.permission.CAMERA
    ) == PackageManager.PERMISSION_GRANTED -> {
        // You can use the API that requires the permission.
    }
    shouldShowRequestPermissionRationale(Manifest.permission.CAMERA) -> {
        // ...
    }
}
```

```
        } else {
            // Explain to the user that the feature is unavailable because the
            // features requires a permission that the user has denied.
            Log.d("Permission", "Camera permission denied")
        }
    }

    // ...

    // When you need to use the camera
    when {
        ContextCompat.checkSelfPermission(
            this,
            Manifest.permission.CAMERA
        ) == PackageManager.PERMISSION_GRANTED -> {
            // You can use the API that requires the permission.
        }
        shouldShowRequestPermissionRationale(Manifest.permission.CAMERA) -> {
            // Show a UI to explain why you need the permission
        }
        else -> {
            // Directly ask for the permission
            requestPermissionLauncher.launch(Manifest.permission.CAMERA)
        }
    }
}
```

Android: The Privacy Dashboard



iOS Permissions: Info.plist

- You must provide a "usage string" in your `Info.plist` file for each permission. This is the message the user will see.

```
<!-- Info.plist -->
<key>NSLocationWhenInUseUsageDescription</key>
<string>We need your location to show you nearby restaurants.</string>
<key>NSCameraUsageDescription</key>
<string>We need access to your camera to scan QR codes.</string>
<key>NSPhotoLibraryUsageDescription</key>
<string>We need access to your photo library so you can share photos.</string>
```

iOS Permissions: Requesting at Runtime

- You use specific frameworks to request permissions.

```
import SwiftUI
import CoreLocation

class LocationManager: NSObject, ObservableObject, CLLocationManagerDelegate {
    private let manager = CLLocationManager()
    @Published var status: CLAuthorizationStatus = .notDetermined

    override init() {
        super.init()
        manager.delegate = self
    }

    func requestPermission() {
        manager.requestWhenInUseAuthorization()
    }

    func locationManagerDidChangeAuthorization(_ manager: CLLocationManager) {
        status = manager.authorizationStatus
        if status == .authorizedWhenInUse || status == .authorizedAlways {
            // Permission granted, you can start using location
            print("Location permission granted")
        } else {
            // Permission denied
            print("Location permission denied")
        }
    }
}
```

```
import CoreLocation
```

```
class LocationManager: NSObject, ObservableObject, CLLocationManagerDelegate {  
    private let manager = CLLocationManager()  
    @Published var status: CLAuthorizationStatus = .notDetermined  
  
    override init() {  
        super.init()  
        manager.delegate = self  
    }  
  
    func requestPermission() {  
        manager.requestWhenInUseAuthorization()  
    }  
  
    func locationManagerDidChangeAuthorization(_ manager: CLLocationManager) {  
        status = manager.authorizationStatus  
        if status == .authorizedWhenInUse || status == .authorizedAlways {  
            // Permission granted, you can start using location  
            print("Location permission granted")  
        } else {  
            // Permission denied  
            print("Location permission denied")  
        }  
    }  
}
```

```
func locationManagerDidChangeAuthorization(_ manager: CLLocationManager) {  
    status = manager.authorizationStatus  
    if status == .authorizedWhenInUse || status == .authorizedAlways {  
        // Permission granted, you can start using location  
        print("Location permission granted")  
    } else {  
        // Permission denied  
        print("Location permission denied")  
    }  
}  
}  
  
// In your SwiftUI View  
struct ContentView: View {  
    @StateObject private var locationManager = LocationManager()  
  
    var body: some View {  
        VStack {  
            Button("Request Location Permission") {  
                locationManager.requestPermission()  
            }  
        }  
    }  
}
```

iOS: App Tracking Transparency

- Since iOS 14.5, you must ask for permission to track users across apps and websites.

```
import AppTrackingTransparency  
import AdSupport
```

```
// ... in your app's initialization logic, e.g., AppDelegate or first View
```

```
func requestTrackingPermission() {  
    ATTrackingManager.requestTrackingAuthorization { status in  
        switch status {  
            case .authorized:  
                // Tracking authorization dialog was shown and we are authorized  
                print("Authorized to track")  
                // Get the IDFA  
                print(ASIdentifierManager.shared().advertisingIdentifier)  
            case .denied:  
                // Tracking authorization dialog was shown and permission is denied  
                print("Denied tracking")  
            case .notDetermined:  
                // Tracking authorization dialog has not been shown  
                print("Tracking not determined")  
            case .restricted:  
                // The user is restricted from granting permission (e.g., parental controls)  
        }  
    }  
}
```

```
import AppTrackingTransparency
import AdSupport

// ... in your app's initialization logic, e.g., AppDelegate or first View

func requestTrackingPermission() {
    ATTrackingManager.requestTrackingAuthorization { status in
        switch status {
        case .authorized:
            // Tracking authorization dialog was shown and we are authorized
            print("Authorized to track")
            // Get the IDFA
            print(ASIdentifierManager.shared().advertisingIdentifier)
        case .denied:
            // Tracking authorization dialog was shown and permission is denied
            print("Denied tracking")
        case .notDetermined:
            // Tracking authorization dialog has not been shown
            print("Tracking not determined")
        case .restricted:
            // The user is restricted from granting permission (e.g., parental controls)
            print("Tracking restricted")
        @unknown default:
            fatalError()
        }
    }
}
```

iOS: The App Privacy Report



Part 5: Proactive Defense

- A concept from criminology: Instead of just reacting, we change the environment to make the "crime" (the attack) harder, riskier, and less rewarding.

Goal 1: Increase the Effort

- **Make it harder for the attacker to succeed.**




How to Increase Effort: MFA

- **Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA)** is the single most effective way to do this.
- Even if an attacker steals your password, they can't log in without your second factor.




How to Increase Effort: Biometrics

- Using Face ID or a Fingerprint scanner is much harder to bypass than a passcode.



How to Increase Effort: Password Managers

- Allows you to have a unique, complex password for every single service without needing to memorize them.



The image shows the 1Password website and a mobile application side-by-side. The website header includes the 1Password logo, navigation links for Product, Resources, Support, and Pricing, and buttons for Sign in, Talk to sales, and Try 1Password Free. The main content on the website features a large smartphone icon displaying the 1Password mobile app interface, which shows a list of saved items like 'Apple', 'PayPal', and 'Google'. Below this, a section titled 'More than a password manager.' discusses features like passkeys, security sharing, and insight reports, with 'Get started' and 'Schedule a demo' buttons. The mobile app interface on the right shows a detailed view of a 'PayPal' item, including fields for 'username' (taylor.appleseed@gmail.com), 'password' (redacted), and 'one-time password' (760-161). The app also displays a 'Security Questions' section and tags for 'shopping' and 'finance'.


Goal 2: Increase the Risks

- **Make it more likely the attacker will be caught or blocked.**




How to Increase Risks: Warning Banners

- Modern apps now warn you about suspicious activity. These are designed to break the spell of urgency.



How to Increase Risks: App Store Vetting

- The review processes for the Apple App Store and Google Play are designed to identify and remove malicious apps before they ever reach you.
 - Automated static/dynamic analysis.
 - Human reviewers.



Goal 3: Reduce the Rewards

- **Make the data they steal useless.**




How to Reduce Rewards: Encryption

- **End-to-End Encryption (E2EE):** Apps like Signal and WhatsApp. The messages are unreadable to anyone except the sender and receiver.
- **On-Device Encryption:** Modern iOS and Android devices are encrypted by default. A stolen, locked phone is a brick in terms of data access.




How to Reduce Rewards: App Sandboxing

- An OS-level defense. Every app runs in its own isolated "sandbox," unable to access the data of other apps.



Secure Coding for Trust

- Biometrics and Secure Storage in Code



Android Biometrics

- Use `BiometricPrompt` for a system-managed authentication dialog.

```
private fun showBiometricPrompt() {  
    val promptInfo = BiometricPrompt.PromptInfo.Builder()  
        .setTitle("Biometric login for my app")  
        .setSubtitle("Log in using your biometric credential")  
        .setNegativeButtonText("Use account password")  
        .build()  
  
    val biometricPrompt = BiometricPrompt(this, ContextCompat.getMainExecutor(this),  
        object : BiometricPrompt.AuthenticationCallback() {  
            override fun onAuthenticationError(errorCode: Int, errString: CharSequence) {  
                super.onAuthenticationError(errorCode, errString)  
                Toast.makeText(applicationContext, "Authentication error: $errString", Toast.LENGTH_SHORT).show()  
            }  
  
            override fun onAuthenticationSucceeded(result: BiometricPrompt.AuthenticationResult) {  
                super.onAuthenticationSucceeded(result)  
                Toast.makeText(applicationContext, "Authentication succeeded!", Toast.LENGTH_SHORT).show()  
                // Proceed with authenticated action  
            }  
        })  
}
```

```
private fun showBiometricPrompt() {
    val promptInfo = BiometricPrompt.PromptInfo.Builder()
        .setTitle("Biometric login for my app")
        .setSubtitle("Log in using your biometric credential")
        .setNegativeButtonText("Use account password")
        .build()

    val biometricPrompt = BiometricPrompt(this, ContextCompat.getMainExecutor(this),
        object : BiometricPrompt.AuthenticationCallback() {
            override fun onAuthenticationError(errorCode: Int, errString: CharSequence) {
                super.onAuthenticationError(errorCode, errString)
                Toast.makeText(applicationContext, "Authentication error: $errString", Toast.LENGTH_SHORT).show()
            }

            override fun onAuthenticationSucceeded(result: BiometricPrompt.AuthenticationResult) {
                super.onAuthenticationSucceeded(result)
                Toast.makeText(applicationContext, "Authentication succeeded!", Toast.LENGTH_SHORT).show()
                // Proceed with authenticated action
            }

            override fun onAuthenticationFailed() {
                super.onAuthenticationFailed()
                Toast.makeText(applicationContext, "Authentication failed", Toast.LENGTH_SHORT).show()
            }
        })
    biometricPrompt.authenticate(promptInfo)
}
```

iOS Biometrics

- Use `LAContext` (Local Authentication) to evaluate a policy.

```
import LocalAuthentication
```

```
func authenticateUser() {
    let context = LAContext()
    var error: NSError?

    if context.canEvaluatePolicy(.deviceOwnerAuthenticationWithBiometrics, error: &error) {
        let reason = "Identify yourself!"

        context.evaluatePolicy(.deviceOwnerAuthenticationWithBiometrics, localizedReason: reason) { success, authenticationError in
            DispatchQueue.main.async {
                if success {
                    // User authenticated successfully
                    print("Authentication successful!")
                } else {
                    // User did not authenticate successfully
                    print("Authentication failed: \(authenticationError?.localizedDescription ?? "No error")")
                }
            }
        }
    } else {
        // Authentication failed due to error
        print("Authentication failed: \(error.localizedDescription)")
    }
}
```

```
import LocalAuthentication


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    let context = LAContext()
    var error: NSError?

    if context.canEvaluatePolicy(.deviceOwnerAuthenticationWithBiometrics, error: &error) {
        let reason = "Identify yourself!"

        context.evaluatePolicy(.deviceOwnerAuthenticationWithBiometrics, localizedReason: reason) { success, authenticationError in
            DispatchQueue.main.async {
                if success {
                    // User authenticated successfully
                    print("Authentication successful!")
                } else {
                    // User did not authenticate successfully
                    print("Authentication failed: \(authenticationError?.localizedDescription ?? "No error")")
                }
            }
        }
    } else {
        // No biometrics available
        print("Biometrics not available: \(error?.localizedDescription ?? "No error")")
    }
}
```

Secure Storage: The Problem

- Never store sensitive data like passwords, tokens, or API keys in `SharedPreferences` or `UserDefaults`. They are stored in plain text.



Android Secure Storage: EncryptedSharedPreferences

- The Jetpack Security library provides a secure, encrypted alternative.

```
import androidx.security.crypto.EncryptedSharedPreferences
import androidx.security.crypto.MasterKeys

// Step 1: Create or retrieve the master key
val masterKeyAlias = MasterKeys.getOrCreate(MasterKeys.AES256_GCM_SPEC)

// Step 2: Create the EncryptedSharedPreferences instance
val sharedPreferences = EncryptedSharedPreferences.create(
    "secret_shared_prefs",
    masterKeyAlias,
    applicationContext,
    EncryptedSharedPreferences.PrefKeyEncryptionScheme.AES256_SIV,
    EncryptedSharedPreferences.PrefValueEncryptionScheme.AES256_GCM
)

// Step 3: Use it like regular SharedPreferences
with(sharedPreferences.edit()) {
    putString("auth_token", "your_super_secreet_auth_token")
    apply()
}
```

```
import androidx.security.crypto.EncryptedSharedPreferences
import androidx.security.crypto.MasterKeys

// Step 1: Create or retrieve the master key
val masterKeyAlias = MasterKeys.getOrCreate(MasterKeys.AES256_GCM_SPEC)

// Step 2: Create the EncryptedSharedPreferences instance
val sharedPreferences = EncryptedSharedPreferences.create(
    "secret_shared_prefs",
    masterKeyAlias,
    applicationContext,
    EncryptedSharedPreferences.PrefKeyEncryptionScheme.AES256_SIV,
    EncryptedSharedPreferences.PrefValueEncryptionScheme.AES256_GCM
)

// Step 3: Use it like regular SharedPreferences
with(sharedPreferences.edit()) {
    putString("auth_token", "your_super_secret_auth_token")
    apply()
}

// Reading the value
val token = sharedPreferences.getString("auth_token", null)
```

iOS Secure Storage: The Keychain

- The Keychain is the system-level, secure enclave for storing small pieces of sensitive data.

```
func saveToken(token: String) {  
    let query: [String: Any] = [  
        kSecClass as String: kSecClassGenericPassword,  
        kSecAttrAccount as String: "com.yourapp.authtoken",  
        kSecValueData as String: token.data(using: .utf8)!,  
        kSecAttrAccessible as String: kSecAttrAccessibleWhenUnlockedThisDeviceOnly  
    ]
```

```
// Delete any existing item  
SecItemDelete(query as CFDictionary)
```

```
// Add the new item  
let status = SecItemAdd(query as CFDictionary, nil)  
guard status == errSecSuccess else {  
    print("Error saving to Keychain: \(status)")  
    return  
}  
print("Successfully saved token to Keychain.")
```

```
let status = SecItemAdd(query as CFDictionary, nil)
guard status == errSecSuccess else {
    print("Error saving to Keychain: \(status)")
    return
}
print("Successfully saved token to Keychain.")
}

func loadToken() -> String? {
    let query: [String: Any] = [
        kSecClass as String: kSecClassGenericPassword,
        kSecAttrAccount as String: "com.yourapp.authtoken",
        kSecReturnData as String: kCFBooleanTrue!,
        kSecMatchLimit as String: kSecMatchLimitOne
    ]
}

var dataTypeRef: AnyObject?
let status = SecItemCopyMatching(query as CFDictionary, &dataTypeRef)


if status == errSecSuccess {
    if let data = dataTypeRef as? Data, let token = String(data: data, encoding: .utf8) {
        return token
    }
}
return nil
}
```

Training and Awareness

- **The Human Firewall**

For Corporate Users

- Regular, mandatory security training.
- Simulated phishing campaigns to test and educate.
- Clear policies on BYOD (Bring Your Own Device).



For Individual Users

- **"Stop, Think, Connect"**
- A simple mantra before clicking any link or responding to an urgent request.

Stop




Think

- Does this make sense?
- Did I expect this message?
- Is this person who they say they are?



Connect

- Only after you have stopped and thought, should you decide to proceed. If in doubt, contact the person or company through a separate, trusted channel (e.g., call the number on the back of your bank card, not the one in the email).



Key Takeaways (1/3)

- **Attackers Target People, Not Just Phones**
- Social engineering exploits human psychology (Authority, Urgency).

Key Takeaways (2/3)

- **Your Habits & Your Code Matter**
 - Permission fatigue and poor password hygiene are major user vulnerabilities.
 - As developers, we must use the Principle of Least Privilege and secure APIs (BiometricPrompt, Keychain).

Key Takeaways (3/3)

- **Build a Human Firewall**
 - Think Like a Criminologist: Make attacks harder (MFA), riskier (warnings), and less rewarding (encryption).
 - "Stop, Think, Connect" is your most powerful tool.

Q&A

- **Questions?**